Agricultural trade research has for a long time recognized the importance of imperfect ) competition. McCalla in 1966 first argued that wheat trade be explained as a duopoly involving the U.S. and Canada. Carter and Schmitz and Alouze, Watson and Sturgess recognized that Japan, the U.S.S.R., and Australia also may exercise market power in wheat trade. The IATRC published a book on imperfect markets in agricultural trade in 1981 highlighting the importance of this issue (McCalla and Josling) . A second conference examining the linkage between imperfect competition and political economy of trade policy was published in 1990 (Carter, McCalla and Sharples) . Most approaches have utilized the conjectural variations method (e.g. Paarlberg andAbbott, 1986  Kolstad and Burris), an approach not included by strictgame theorists among their tools (McMillan, Tirole) . Some recent approaches have followed explicit game theoretic methods, however (Karp and McCalla; Hillberg; Johnson, Mahe.and Roe; Kennedy, von Witzke and Roe).
Incorporation of complex theoretical approaches addressing imperfect competition, and especially based on game theory, into routine trade policy analysis is uncommon. For example, while issues of imperfect competition and strategic policy interaction lay at the heart of the recently concluded GATT agreement, most models used to assess trade liberalization impacts assumed competitive world markets, albeit with exogenously set policy instruments through which games may be played (Roningen, Sullivan and Dixit; OECD) . Evaluations of the U.S. agricultural export enhancement program (EEP) have also generally used competitive models and exogenous policy instruments, and do not explicitly examine the game theoretic aspects of market outcomes (e.g.
Haley and Skully). Johnson, Mahe and Roe demonstrated that explicit game theoretic analysis of
GATT can yield insight into the negotiation process and its outcome, however.
This paper extends that analysis in search of the rationality behind the agreement on agriculture . is appropriJte. A few large countries or regional blocs engage in trade ofcommodities-they are not Policy mak~rs, as well as the policy debate, make clear the importance of strategic interactions models, while a few are explicitly game theoretic. The common underlying structure among both types of models can be represented in the relatively simple framework presented below.
A Model of Redistribution in Imperfect Agricultural Markets
A stylized model of world wheat trade is utilized to illustrate under differing institutional arrangements (game structures) the levels of export subsidies (or taxes --the strategies), net exports and the political payoffs for four regions (or players): the U.S., EU, CAIRNS and Importers. This.
model highlights the importance of redistributional goals of agricultural policy, captured by using a payoff function (government objective) which is a weighted sum of producer surplus, consumer surplus and government budgetary expense, and the potential strategic interactions among players, since their strategies (export subsidies) give rise to differing payoffs depending upon opponents' strategies. This simplified structure captures the essential elements of many of the contributions to this literature (e.g. Paarlberg and Abbott; Johnson, Mahe and Roe; Kennedy, von Witzke and Roe).
A supply-utilization accounting identity, or trade balance in an open ecoriomy, captures the effects of producer and consumer behavioral adjustments to policy, and hence prices, on trade:
;;.
(1)
where Ek is exports from region k (imports if negative); Qk is supply (production} in region k, which depends on Psk , producer support prices in region k, following a supply function; and I\ is demand (consumption) in region k, which depend on Pdk , the domestic market price in region k, according
:
to a demadd function. World market equilibrium requires:
Price !Lages relate border (world) prices to domestic market prices using policy instrument settings (exports subsidies and producer support via price interventions):
! where Pwi!s the world price, Swk is the export subsidy (import tariff) offered by region k, and
where Sqk is a coupled producer subsidy in region k, offered via a price intervention .
. Political payoff functions.( each player's objective in the game) are given by:
I where Zpk i~ the political payoff in region k, Zqk is producer surplus for region k, Zdk is consumer
surplus for region k, and Sdck is decoupled producer support in region k. Welfare weights are W qk I base year ~f 1986, when the Uruguay round commenced, is simulated using this data, and ,.
. parlance a move from second best to first best instrum..ents. Export subsidies were not eliminated correspond~ to the "Constrained Nash equilibrium" wher¢ subsidy expenditures are limited to 64%
·of pre GATf levels foundin the "Nash eqUilibrium". Export subsidies are the strategies and Zpkare
the payoffftmctions for each pl~yer. Cartels would form (the game would become cooperative) if
in the self-i~terest of members, and if real world institutions would permit the cartel to hold together. ·
I
Joint settingj of subsidies by the EUand U.S., and explicit sid~ payments, are probably GATT illegal I and at Ieast~olitically incorrect. These include alternatives rejected in the negotiation process.
I .
. These rJsults, while only a stylized repres~ntation of this market, reflect the concerns and issues· I : . . . .
IMPLICATION\S OF GAME THEORY.... 9·· I i I raised above. The market outcome is a prisoners' dilemma in that unilateral.refoim is always the worst case for the country which reforms, and the best outcome for the country which retains its subsidies. Free trade is only the optimal outcome for the world as a whole, and so would not be a cooperative solution unless Importers' political payoff also counts. The U.S.-EU cartel is optimal for thetwo exporters taken together, but the U.S. would prefer.the constrained Nash equilibrium unless a side payment were offered.
It is useful to note that subsidies are larger under the Nash equilibrium outcome than tinder the U.S.-EUcaitel-implying that lack of cooperation has led to subsidies which are indeed greater than desirable (found under cooperation). Hence, by constraining subsidies to lower (non-zero) levels, the outcome is preferred to the status quo by both players, and a different distribution ofbenefits, notnecessarily requiring side payments, is accomplished. Admittedly, the problem in coming up with this solution is in properly setting the subsidy limits, and GATT is a rather blunt instrument for that job. Also, redistribution is more important than strategic interaction in setting subsidy levels, since all subsidies and payoffs for non-:cooperative games are in a similar range, and are much different from the free trade outcomes. When simulations .are run with interest group weights equal to one, so the political economy aspect of the model is eliminated, optimal interventions are an export tax for the U.S., an import subsidy for the EU under the Nash equilibrium, and a uniform export tax for the cartel. It should also be noted that the actual GATT limits imposed on subsidies reflect the diminishing importance put on producer welfare over time, qnd likely in the future.
The minor role of the CAIRNS group in determining the GATT final'outcome is also consistent with these results. As a group of non-subsidizing exporters, with lower weights on producer welfare, an exporter cartel including CAIRNS would have had that region imposing export taxes rather than
subsidies. That is, as the region with the lowest weight on producer surplus, CAIRNS would have I .
• backed off the export market, and the higher prices would have benefitte~ all exporters at the producer surplus under free trade). Weights are from Kennedy, von Witzke and Roe for the first set of simulations, and give subsidies close to 1986levels in the Nash Equilibrium solution. A second set ofsimulations sets weights equal to one, corresponding to a conventional welfare measure which does not reflect income redistribution objectives of agricultural policy.
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